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iI’d like to thank my commentators for their insightful and challenging replies. My aim
in the paper was to stimulate creative thinking about solidarity in diverse societies, and
these seven comments represent exactly the sort of constructive analyses I was hoping
to prompt.
I can’t address all of the issues raised by the commentators, but let me begin
by emphasizing that my concern is with social justice, which I take to be a much
more ambitious goal than simply hospitality, “conviviality” or “everyday sociability”, in
Glick Schiller terms. I take it as a given that people of different ethnic and religious
backgrounds are perfectly capable of living sociably as neighbours: in fact, humans have
always done so. We clearly do not need national solidarity to generate this capacity.
But I do not believe that everyday sociability is sufficient to achieve social justice, or
to build and sustain a redistributive welfare state. Social justice, at least as understood
within the social-democratic/liberal-egalitarian tradition1, requires not just the civilities
and hospitalities of everyday life, but a commitment to building a society of equals,
which in turn requires active state measures to address unchosen disadvantages in peo-
ple’s life chances. The recent explosive rise in inequality across the Western societies
indicates that we are moving farther and farther from this goal.
So the central challenge of social justice as I see it is not how to enable people to live
together peacefully as neighbours, but rather how to mobilize people to support pol-
icies that address disadvantage. And the most cursory glance at human history would
indicate that the existence of everyday sociability does not, by itself, generate a com-
mitment to social justice in this robust sense. Throughout human history, everyday
civilities have gone hand-in-hand with acceptance of deep social stratification. In my
paper, I argued that this should not be surprising, since everyday sociability rests on a
different normative logic than that of a social-democratic welfare state: an ethic of
hospitality and conviviality is not the same as an ethic of social justice. Glick Schiller
clearly disagrees with this: she thinks that everyday sociabilities are sufficient to sustain
a commitment to social justice. But she gives no evidence for this claim, and does not
address my argument that they rest on a different normative logic.
Her focus on the importance of local-level conviviality is shared by other commenta-
tors (eg., Bauböck & Engbersen), and is a central trope in the recent European litera-
ture on city-level interculturalism (eg., Zapata-Barrero, 2011; Oosterlynck, Loopmans,
Schuermans, Vandenabeele, & Zemni, 2016). But the existence of convivial neighbour-
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reduce disadvantages. In fact, the existence of convivial neighbourhoods is fully com-
patible with – perhaps even the hallmark of - neoliberal multiculturalism. In this re-
spect, the new European rhetoric of local-level interculturalism seems distressingly
similar to the old 1990s rhetoric of neoliberal multiculturalism2. They both privilege
interaction across ethnic and religious lines at the local level and in civil society, as a
means of increasing comfort with, and reaping the benefits of, cultural diversity, while
ignoring the deeper economic, political and social structures of liberal-democratic
nation-states that generate disadvantage3.
Perhaps the state of inter-ethnic relations in some European cities is so dire that the
best we can hope for is to achieve civility and sociability. Or perhaps cities are the only
promising space for pro-diversity initiatives, given the power of anti-immigrant parties
at the national level. If so, the focus on local initiatives makes strategic sense. But we
should not exaggerate what can be achieved at the local level, or what we lose by giving
up on national level policies. While the progressive defenders of diversity are fighting
for intercultural neighbourhoods and intercultural cities, conservatives are defining the
agenda around national security, national citizenship, national solidarity and national
identity – all in ways that systematically marginalise and stigmatise minorities. Local
victories will be both limited and fragile unless the national agenda can be reframed
through a progressive multicultural vision of nationhood. Indeed, some commentators
argue that insofar as the intercultural cities agenda in Europe seeks to bypass rather
than directly challenge the securitized national discourse around migration, it lacks
transformative potential, serving at best to manage securitization4.
Certainly in the Canadian context, constricting our vision to local conviviality would
be a regression. Canadians like to believe that we excel at everyday sociability in inter-
ethnic contexts, and the cross-national evidence suggests that Canadians are indeed
unusually comfortable with diversity in everyday settings (Kymlicka, 2010). But the ex-
tent to which this everyday sociability in Canada is matched by a commitment to social
justice has varied enormously, and my concern is how to motivate the latter.
So my interest is: what more, or what else, is needed to sustain a commitment to so-
cial justice, beyond everyday sociability? And my suggestion in the paper was that (1)
nationhood has helped in the past to underpin this commitment; and (2) nationhood
can continue to play this role, even in the face of growing diversity, so long as it is
reconceived in a multicultural manner. Glick Schiller disputes the former claim, which
she describes as a “communitarian just-so story”. Most of the commentators, however,
accept the former claim, but express a range of doubts about the latter. Nationhood,
they suggest, may have worked in the past, but it can no longer serve this function,
and/or it cannot be reconceived in multiculturalist terms.
I cannot respond in depth to all of the doubts, but I would like to respond to one in par-
ticular. According to Engbersen, multiculturalism does not work in an era of liquid mobil-
ity, where more and more residents are temporary or “floating populations”, with variable
and precarious legal statuses. Multiculturalism, he suggests, might have worked in an era
when there was a finite number of immigrant groups all of whom settled permanently,
but cannot work in an era of transient flows coming and going in all directions.
I agree that liquid mobility puts multicultural approaches under intense strain. But I
think liquid mobility puts all prevailing models under strain, and it’s not clear what
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are being replaced by “general policies aimed at all citizens” and by “civic integration
policies”, but he does not explain how either of these actually helps deal with the chal-
lenges of liquid mobility. So far as I can tell, both civic integration policies and general
citizenship policies are as rooted in the idea of permanent settlement as multicultural-
ism policies. Indeed, Engbersen himself notes that transient populations are typically
exempted from the requirements of these general integration/citizenship policies, both
in Canada and in Europe.
So why then do we see increased reliance on general citizenship policies and civic in-
tegration policies, despite the rise of liquid mobility? The answer, I would argue, is that
many migrants do settle permanently. Contrary to the image of liquid mobility, we are
not all refugees or floating populations. Many migrants settle and become long-term
stakeholders in their new society. And so it remains a vital task of a democratic state to
figure out the appropriate terms of long-term integration into the host society. Both
multiculturalism policies and civic integration policies are a response to that task, but
they differ in how they understand the fair terms of integration. According to the study
Engbersen himself relies on, the shift from multiculturalism to civic integration involves
“placing greater responsibility on the individual immigrant for their own integration”
(Scholten, Collet, & Petrovic, 2016). Exactly so: the shift from multiculturalism to civic
integration is not about how best to deal with liquid mobility; it is about how to allo-
cate the burdens and responsibilities of long-term integration. And I would argue that
most civic integration policies are simply unfair in the terms of integration they offer
(Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). Moreover, as I suggested in my paper, they also tend to re-
produce harsh judgements about the deservingness of immigrants, which is a funda-
mental obstacle to inclusive solidarity. So they are unfair in and of themselves, and
have knock-on effects in undermining a sense of mutual obligation.
Engbersen acknowledges that civic integration policies are likely to create “specific
migrant groups that are in vulnerable positions” and who will face challenges to “enable
their transition from non- or partial membership to full social membership”. That is in-
deed the challenge, and my argument is that coercive civic integration policies worsen
the problem, whereas multicultural nationhood can help. Engbersen appears to dis-
agree, but I don’t yet see his argument for rejecting multicultural nationhood, or his al-
ternative to it. In any event, I think the issue of liquid mobility and floating populations
is a bit of a red herring. Insofar as the fundamental policy choice is between multicul-
turalism policies and civic integration policies, both options lay out the terms of inte-
gration for people with the right to stay and to settle long-term, and both need to be
evaluated for their intrinsic fairness and for their impact on an ethos of solidarity5.
I have focused in this reply on the critiques that seemed most in opposition to my
approach. I should say, however, that I’m pleased to note that other commentators are
more sympathetic to the idea of a multicultural national solidarity, at least as an aspir-
ation, even if they raise cogent questions about the politics of multicultural nationhood.
I view the commentaries by Bauböck, Bloemraad, Kriesi, and Meer as all providing con-
structive amendments to my (sketchy) political story, and I’m inclined to simply accept
most of their suggested amendments, as well as their sober assessment of the political
challenges we face. As Kriesi notes, the challenge of reconciling multiculturalism and
nationhood is connected to a much deeper challenge afflicting the social-democratic
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social democratic parties and their traditional working-class supporters who are more
socially conservative. The ideas of multiculturalism and national solidarity may be quite
compatible at a theoretical level, but these ideas do not exist in a philosophical vacuum:
they are carried into politics and championed by different sectors of the population,
with different priorities and interests. Much has been written about how to overcome
that gap, to which I have little to add, except to take some solace from the historical
reminders that Bloemraad and Meer provide us. As they note, there was nothing auto-
matic or smooth about creating national solidarities in the first half of the twentieth
century, in the face of powerful class cleavages, strong localisms, and sectarian differ-
ences (eg., between Protestants and Catholics), even in a period of relatively low immi-
gration. As Meer rightly puts it, “deep diversity is not the preserve of ethnic and
migration-related difference”. Yet the social-democratic left did succeed in building na-
tional solidarities, in spite of – and indeed partly through – the political conflicts gen-
erated by this project. And like Kriesi, I believe that a healthy dose of “enlightened
understanding, empowerment and leadership” can help to sustain and reframe those
solidarities in a multicultural direction.
Endnotes
1I defend this liberal egalitarian conception of justice, and its convergence with
social-democratic views, in Kymlicka 2002. Favell suggests that my dismissive
comments about neoliberalism raise doubts about my liberal credentials. I cannot fully
address that charge here, except to say that I share the core liberal commitment to the
right of individuals to decide for themselves what sort of life is worth leading, and as a
corollary, a commitment to the constitutional protection of a set of basic civil and
political liberties. This anti-paternalistic and anti-perfectionist commitment is shared
by all liberals, left or right. What defines the left-liberal view is that a liberal state must
also remedy unchosen disadvantages. This is the fundamental point of disagreement
with libertarianism (as a political philosophy) and neoliberalism (as a political agenda).
Having said that, I accept Favell’s point that the expansion of mobility rights and non-
discrimination rights within the EU should be seen as an accomplishment, from any
liberal perspective, and not discounted by simply labelling it as “neoliberal”. And I
accept Bauböck’s point that obligations of global justice constrain state prerogatives to
regulate admissions. Trying to achieve social justice through closed borders is therefore
neither morally permissible nor practically feasible. This is precisely why, on my view,
we need to reconcile multiculturalism and solidarity.
2On the celebration of local conviviality as the hallmark of neoliberal multiculturalism,
see Murphy, O’Brien, & Watson, 2003.
3Or so I argue in Kymlicka, 2016.
4Alkopher (2015). For another discussion of the limits of promoting local
interculturalism in the face of national-level indifference or hostility, see Downing
2015.
5From very different directions, the commentaries by Glick Schiller and Favell both
suggest that if we have really moved from an age of migration to an age of mobility,
then the choice is not civic integration versus multiculturalism, but some entirely new
post-national constellation.
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